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Abstract
This thesis investigates the topic of verifying network status validity with a Cyber Security
perspective.
The fields of interest are dynamic networks like OpenFlow and Software Defined Net-
works, where these problems may have larger attack surface and greater impact.
The framework under study is called Header Space Analysis, a formal model and
protocol-agnostic framework that allows to perform static policy checking both in classical
TCP/IP networks and modern dynamic SDN.
The goal is to analyse some classes of network failure, declaring valid network states and
recognizing invalid ones.
HSA has evolved in NetPlumber, to face problems caused by high dynamics of SDN networks.
The main difference between HSA and NetPlumber is the incremental way that the latter
performs checks and keeps state updated, verifying the actual state compliance with the expected
state defined in its model, but the concept is the same: declare what’s allowed and recognize
states violating that model.
The second and main contribute of this thesis is to expand existing vision with the purpose
of increasing the network security degree, introducing model-checking-based networks through
the definition of an abstraction layer that provides a security-focused model-checking
service to SDN.
The developed system is called MCS (Model Checking Service) and is implemented for an
existing SDN solution called ONOS, using NetPlumber as underlying model-checking technology,
but it’s validity is general, uncoupled with any kind of SDN implementation.
Finally, the demo shows how some cases of well-known security attacks in modern networks
can be prevented or mitigated using the reactive behavior of MCS.
CHAPTER 1
Software Defined Networks
1. Introduction
In the last years digitisation and interconnection of society brought a greater usage of tradi-
tional TCP/IP networks.
However the Internet protocol stack was designed looking society of the late ’70s, not today.
Use-cases changed and today’s demand isn’t the same as it was before.
Now, traditional IP networks are complex and very hard to manage. It is both difficult to
configure the network according to predefined policies and to reconfigure it to respond to faults,
load and changes.
The main criticism is current networks are vertically integrated : decisions about how traffic
should be handled are coupled with its forwarding.
In this scenario, modern standards have been proposed, such as OpenFlow from Stan-
ford University. OpenFlow is then evolved in a dynamic networking structure called Soft-
ware Defined Network.
2. Planes
SDN[5] breaks vertical integration into two planes. Every plane has a well-defined set of
responsibilities:
• Control Plane (CP):
Decides how to handle network traffic.
• Data Plane (DP):
Forwards traffic according to the decisions made by the Control Plane, without
making any decision.
In this scenario, OpenFlow is just a possible implementation of the Data Plane.
This approach allows to centralize decisions in a logically centralized controller.
Finally, Management Plane (MP) is defined as the set of applications that leverage
functions offered by the NOS (in particular the Northbound Interface) to define policies, which
are translated to southbound-specific instructions that program the behaviour of Forwarding
Devices.
3. Principles
SDN architecture has four pillars:
(1) Control Plane and Data Plane are decoupled: network devices will become
simple forwarding elements.
(2) Forwarding decisions are flow-based, instead of destination-based. A flow is de-
fined by a set of packet field values acting as match criterion and a set of actions that
define what to do. Flow abstraction allows unifying the behavior of different types of
network devices, including switches, firewalls, routers, . . .
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(3) Control logic is moved to an external entity called SDN Controller (or Net-
work Operating System), that provides resources and abstractions to facilitate the
programming of forwarding devices based on a logically centralized abstract network
view.
Logical centralization of control logic makes simpler and less error-prone to modify
network policies through high-level languages and software components.
Also, centralization of control logic in a controller with global knowledge of the net-
work state simplifies the development of more sophisticated Virtual Network Func-
tion.
(4) Network is programmable through software applications running on top of NOS,
that interacts with the underlying Data Plane devices.
Figure 1. SDN architecture
4. Abstractions
From a application point-of-view, SDN can be defined by three abstractions:
(1) Forwarding abstraction: Should allow any forwarding behavior desired by network
applications while hiding details of the underlying hardware. OpenFlow is one example
of such abstraction. It allows to reason about Forwarding Devices (FDs) instead
of physical devices: hardware or software-based Data Plane device that perform a set
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of elementary operations through a well-defined instruction set (for example flow rules)
used to take actions on the incoming packets.
(2) Distribution abstraction: Network applications should be shielded from the vagaries
of distributed state, making the distributed control problem a logically centralized one.
Its realization requires a common distribution layer, called SDN controller (or Net-
work Operating System).
(3) Specification abstraction: Network applications should be able to express the desired
network behavior without being responsible for implementing that behavior itself. This
can be achieved because specification layer maps the global view of the physical network
(provided by the SDN controller) into simplified abstract models that can be used by
network applications.
5. Interfaces
Interaction between SDN layers is regulated by the following interfaces:
• Southbound Interface (SBI): The instruction set of the Forwarding Devices
is defined by the southbound API. SBI can be seen as the connecting bridge between
NOS and FD, the main instrument used to clearly separate the Control Plane with
the Data Plane, thus these APIs are still tightly tied to the Forwarding Devices
of the underlying physical (or virtual) infrastructure.
• Northbound Interface (NBI): The Network Operating System can offer an
API to application developers. This API represents the Northbound Interface.

CHAPTER 2
SDN Control Plane implementation
1. Southbound Interface: OpenFlow
1.1. Introduction. OpenFlow[2] is a possible (and commonly used) Southbound In-
terface. It allows interoperability and the deployment of vendor-agnostic network devices.
1.2. OpenFlow switch. An OpenFlow switch consists of:
• One or more Flow Tables
• A Group Table
• A OpenFlow channel
The Flow Tables and Group Table are used to perform packet lookups and forwarding.
The OpenFlow channel is used to communicate with the SDN Controller, both to
inform about new events and to let SDN Controller manage the OpenFlow switch via the
OpenFlow protocol.
Figure 1. OpenFlow switch
The OpenFlow pipeline contains multiple Flow Tables. Flow Tables are sequentially
numbered, starting from 0. Each Flow Table contains multiple Flow Entries.
Pipeline processing defines how incoming packets are consumed by Flow Tables and what
result is produced.
When there is an incoming packet in a OpenFlow switch, it is matched against the Flow
Entries of the first Flow Table to select a Flow Entry.
11
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The following figure shows how a Flow Entry is structured:
Figure 2. Flow Entry
Where:
• Match Fields: Used to match against packets. These consist of the ingress port and
packet headers, and optionally metadata specified by a previous table.
• Priority: Matching precedence of the Flow Entry.
• Counters: Updates for matching packets.
• Instructions: instructions that should be added to the Action Set.
• Timeouts: maximum amount of time before flow is expired
• Cookie: opaque data value chosen by the controller. It may be used to filter flow
statistics, modification, deletion, . . . . It is not used when processing packets.
Pipeline processing typically go through next tables until the last table is reached and the
instructions available in the Action Set will be executed.
If a matching Flow Entry does not direct packets to another Flow Table, pipeline
processing stops at this table. When a pipeline processing stops, the packet is processed with its
Action Set and usually forwarded.
If a packet does not match a Flow Entry in a Flow Table, there is a Table Miss.
The behavior of a Table Miss depends on the table configuration, for example: dropping
packets, passing them to another table, sending them to SDN Controller via messages.
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Figure 3. Packet processing
Possible instructions include:
• Meter meter-id (optional): Direct packet to the specified meter.
• Apply-Actions actions (optional): Applies the specific actions immediately, without
changing the Action Set.
• Write-Actions actions (required): Merges the specified actions into the current Ac-
tion Set.
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• Clear-Actions (optional): Clears all the actions in the Action Set.
• Write-Metadata metadata (optional): Writes the masked metadata value into the
metadata field.
• Goto-Table next-table-id (required): Indicates the next table in the processing
pipeline (must be greater than the current table). Flow Entries of the last Flow
Table cannot include this instruction.
1.3. OpenFlow protocol. The provides three information sources for Network Op-
erating System:
• Controller-to-Switch Messages: Messages initiated by the controller and may or
may not require a response from the switch.
Examples include:
– Features: Message to request switch capabilities.
– Modify-State, Read-State: Messages to read and modify switch state.
– Configuration: Message to change switch configuration.
– Packet OUT: Message to send packets in the specified port on the switch and, thus,
to forward packets received via a Packet IN message. Message must also contain
a list of actions that the switch should apply for that packet.
– Barrier: Barriers are request/reply messages used to ensure message dependencies
have been met or to receive notifications for completed operations.
• Asynchronous Messages: Messages sent without a controller soliciting them from a
switch. Switches send asynchronous to controllers to denote an event, such as packet
arrival, switch state change, error, . . .
Examples include:
– Packet IN: Transfer control of a packet to the controller. This kind of event is
always sent for (1) packets forwarded to port CONTROLLER (2) table-miss Flow
Entry is hit.
– Flow-Removed: Inform the controller about the removal of a Flow Entry from
a Flow Table.
– Port-status: Inform the controller of a change on a port.
• Symmetric Messages: Messages sent without solicitation, in either direction.
A typical SDN controller manages multiple OpenFlow channels, each one to a different
OpenFlow switch.
An OpenFlow switch typically have one OpenFlow channel to a single SDN Con-
troller.
Once connection between a switch and the SDN Controller has been established, they
negotiate the protocol version to be used. Then, other messages following the negotiated protocol
version can be exchanged through the channel.
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2. SDN Controller: ONOS
2.1. Architecture. ONOS[6] is a SDN controller solution organized as a multi-module OSGi
project, where modules are managed as OSGi bundles.
OSGi defines an architecture for developing and deploying modular systems.
Its architecture is layered :
Figure 4. architecture
Where:
• Bundles: Bundles are the OSGi components made by the developers.
• Services: The services layer connects bundles in a dynamic way by offering a publish-
find-bind model for plain old Java objects.
• Life-Cycle: The API to install, start, stop, update, and uninstall bundles.
• Modules: The layer that defines how a bundle can import and export code.
• Security: The layer that handles the security aspects.
• Execution Environment: Defines what methods and classes are available in a specific
platform.
Every bundle has its own lifecycle:
Figure 5. Bundle lifecycle
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In ONOS this allows to build an open system where modules can be added on-demand and
are decoupled from the core that handles the main NOS functionality and provides main network
abstractions.
Inside a bundle, multiple OSGi components and services can be defined.
This perfectly maps to the concept of ONOS service. In fact, both have dependencies and a
lifecycle. For this reason, most of ONOS services are implemented as OSGi services.
2.2. Tiers, Sub-systems, Components. ONOS system is organized in tiers. Each tier
hosts some sub-systems and a well-defined interface. Tier interfaces are used to perform inter-
tier interaction. Each sub-system is a collection of components making up a service that provides
the desired functionality.
Figure 6. ONOS Tiers
As shown above, a sub-system can span over multiple layers.
In particular:
• Northbound API Tier allows to the applications to use defined services.
• Core Tier defines Manager abstraction. It allows to translate low-level services
defined in Southbound Interface to high-level services defined in Northbound
Interface and to receive information from applications.
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• Southbound API Tier allows to the Core Tier to interact with Providers
Tier via two main abstractions: ProviderService and ProviderRegistry.
• Providers Tier defines protocol-specific implementation of the desired function-
alities. For example for devices sub-system there are: OpenFlowDeviceProvider,
OVSDBDeviceProvider, . . .
• Providers Tier defines protocol-specific implementation of the desired functional-
ities.
• Protocols Tier allows to interact with forwarding elements, by implementing
needed communication protocols.

CHAPTER 3
Security in SDN
1. Introduction
In early days of SDN, security wasn’t considered as an important factor, thus SDN resulted to
be very insecure by design.
The architecture of SDN introduces radical changes in the vertical network integration model
by decoupling Data Plane from the Control Plane. This poses new threats both from
internal and external actors and a much more broader attack surface than in static networks.
In particular, the logical centralization of the network intelligence put the entire network at
risk if the SDN Controller is compromised.
Moreover, even if SDN Controllers aren’t compromised, but just a single network box’s
security fails, it can compromise the SDN Controller state and thus the entire network.
This is possible because pure SDN solutions available today don’t have the concept of se-
curity isolation. On the other hand, each layer of SDN has its own security requirements and
implications.
Since a single point of control can gain entire network control, a single point of failure can
possibly exploit the entire network.
Imagine if you request a bank transaction and your sensitive information is stolen just because
somewhere, not even between you and the bank, a network box is compromised, injecting
malicious flow-rules to remove you from the network.
Imagine if your pacemaker monitoring solution stops working, and cannot communicate
with your medical institute about health problems, just because networking failed due to a
compromised SDN Controller that has infected the remaining parts of the network system.
These are just simple Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, but also more complex attacks are
feasible.
The centralized knowledge base can be used for further attacks, like reprogramming the entire
network to modify the network flow or to steal sensitive information.
Here, the principle “Security Is Everyone's Responsibility” can't be applied: a compromised
network box can’t compromise the entire network. Compromised sources need to be recognized
and they shouldn’t interfere with the rest of the network.
Security must be built as part of SDN architecture to ensure the integrity of the network
system.
As always, we need to face a technology that isn’t secure by design. SDN research moved from
analysing network problems to security problems.
Many ideas and solutions have been proposed but none of them became the de-facto standard.
In the rest of this thesis we will try to use a formal model (called Header Space Analysis)
and its evolution (called NetPlumber) to address network security issues in Software De-
fined Network.
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2. Security vulnerabilities, attacks and challenges
SDN networks provide advanced and complex solutions that involve many actors to interact
in a way that is programmable.
This amplifies the attack surface of existing threats and leads to new vulnerabilities in various
SDN layers[1]:
Figure 1. SDN threats
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3. Some practical cases / examples
• Malicious or compromised Network Application:
– DoS chained applications
– sidesteps to use chained applications authorizations
– modifies SDN Controller database to change its perception of the underlying
network
– retrieves SDN Controller information as part of the reconnaissance stage of
infection
– overwrites flow rule or clear a flow table to cause unexpected network behaviour
and trigger attacks at lower levels, like network boxes DoS, Man-in-the-
Middle attacks, . . .
– exhausts all the available system resources and affect performance or DoS other
Network Applications
– exploits SDN Controller and thus can execute system commands, like exit to
terminate the controller
• If a Network Application is compromised and its information is used somewhere
else, for example a DBMS containing user sensitive data, other applications may use
those information without knowing that the source shouldn’t be trusted because it was
compromised. That is due to compelling mechanisms to establish trust to certify SDN
Controller and Network Applications don’t exist yet
• Malicious or compromised network box:
– floods a target SDN Controller with Packet IN, in order to compromise it
– forges and sends a ARP packet relayed as Packet IN, fooling the SDN Con-
troller into installing malicious flow rules to divert traffic flows, possibly for
eavesdropping, thereby allowing a malicious host to intercept traffic intended for
another host
– along with another accomplice, initiate arbitrary flows to fool the OpenFlow
switch and the SDN Controller into installing flow rules that create loops or
black-holes in the network
– uses the Southbound Interface to modify Control Messages exchanged
between the Control Plane and the Data Plane, such as flow-rule messages
to corrupt network behaviour
– steals sensitive information by sniffing the Control Channel
– floods the SBI’s communication interface to DoS other network boxes (thus the
Data Plane) and the SDN Controller (thus the Control Plane)
4. Summing up
We’ve just named few examples, but we clearly can see there is an entire world of possible
attacks, which one has many ways to be triggered and executed.
In this scenario, it’s not feasible to analyse and resolve all possible single vulnerabilities and
threats, but we need a generic and pervasive long-range approach to solve classes of threats.
We will focus later on a broad-based approach to verify network state consistency that will
provide a way to recognise some classes of threats and possibly prevent them, by eliminating
root causes of related problems.

CHAPTER 4
Header Space Analysis
1. Introduction
Header Space Analysis[3] is a generic framework which provides a set of tools to model
and check networks for classes of failures in a protocol-independent way.
HSA relies on a formal model, built as a geometric model, where:
• packets are points in a geometric space
• network boxes are transfer functions on the same geometric space
2. Taxonomy
The following taxonomy defines concepts used later:
2.1. header (h). A flat sequence of ones and zeros. It doesn’t necessarily correspond to
the packet header, but it could:
• include just a part of the header
• include all of the header
• include the header and part of the packet payload: in this case the payload affects
packet processing, that might be useful when modelling a Intrusion Detection
System
2.2. header space (H). A geometric space, where:
• Every point is a header
• A flow is a region in the {0, 1}L space, where L is an upper-bound on the header
length
Figure 1. Building a header space
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2.3. wildcard expression (w). A sequence of L bits, where each bit can assume values
in {0, 1, x}.
Each wildcard expression corresponds to a hypercube in H.
2.4. flow (f). A union of wildcard expression
2.5. network box (n). Any possible middlebox inside the network (also called switch).
It has external interfaces called ports.
Every port has a unique identifier. A network box is a node that can be modelled using
its transfer function, called switch transfer function (T ), that maps header h arriving
on port p:
(1) T (h, p) = (h, p)→ {(h1, p1), (h2, p2), . . .}
Notice that T depends on input/output port to model port-specific behavior, for example
Load Balancing.
2.6. network space (N). The space of all possible packet headers, localized at all
possible input ports in the network, defined as the cartesian product:
(2) {0, 1}Lx{1, . . . , P}
Where {1, . . . , P} is the list of all ports in the network.
Every point in this space represents a packet traversing on a link.
2.7. network transfer function (Ψ). When a packet traverses the network, it
is transformed from one point in the network space to another point. The function that
describes the operation is protocol-independent and it can be obtained combining all network
boxes behavior together we create a composite transfer function describing the overall
behavior of the network, called network transfer function:
(3) Ψ(h, p) =

T1(h, p) if p ∈ switch1
T...(h, p) if p ∈ switch...
Tn(h, p) if p ∈ switchn
2.8. topology transfer function (Γ). Models behavior of links in the network:
(4) Γ(h, p) =
{
{(h, p∗)} if p is connected to p∗
{} if p is not connected
We can apply the following function at each hop, to model a packet that traverses the
network:
(5) Φ(.) = Ψ(Γ(.))
2.9. slice transfer function (Ψs). Captures behavior of all rules installed by the
Control Plane of slice S
2.10. permission (P ). A subset of {read(r),write(w)}.
2.11. slice network space (Υ). A subset of the network space N controlled by
the slice S.
2.12. slice (S). The tuple (Ψs, P,Υ).
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3. Modelling network boxes with HSA
In this section we’ll use the taxonomy defined above to model some kind of networking
devices with HSA, transforming all of them in a single entity called network box, where the
difference between them is encapsulated into the transfer function.
3.1. IPv4 Router. A IPv4 Router can be seen as a network box that implements
the following main high-level functions:
• Rewrite source and destination MAC address
• Decrement TTL
• Update checksum
• Forward to outgoing port
Thus the transfer function is:
(6) TIPv4(.) = Tfwd(Tchksum(Tttl(Tmac(.))))
Where:
• Tfwd = {(h, ip_lookup(ip_dst(h)))}, where: ip_lookup(.) : ip_dst→ port
• Tmac(.) looks up the next hop MAC address and updates source and destination MAC
addresses
•
Tttl(.) =
{
drop_packet if ip_ttl(h) = 0
rewrite(h, ip_ttl(), ip_ttl(h)− 1) if ip_ttl(h) 6= 0
• Tchksum(.) updates the IP checksum
If we focus just on IP routing, we simplify the model in:
(7) TIPv4(.) = Tfwd(.) =

{(h, p1)} if ip_dst(h) ∈ S1
{(h, p2)} if ip_dst(h) ∈ S2
. . . . . .
{(h, pn)} if ip_dst(h) ∈ Sn
{} otherwise
Where Si is the subnet where the packet should be forwarded.
3.2. Firewall. A firewall can be modelled as following:
• Extract IP and TCP headers
• Match extracted headers against the wildcard expressions which model Access
Control List rules
• If the header matches, forward the relative packet
• Otherwise, drop it
3.3. NAT. A NAT can be implemented using rewrite rules in packet headers.
4. HSA algebra
In order to implement algorithms based on HSA framework, the following basic operations
on header space H are defined:
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4.1. Intersection. Given two headers, intersection is defined as the following bit-wise op-
eration:
0 1 x
0 0 z 0
1 z 1 1
x 0 1 x
Where z means the bitwise intersection is empty. It is an annihilator: if any bit returns z,
the intersection of all bits is empty.
4.2. Union. In general, a union of wildcard expressions cannot be simplified. This is
why a header space is defined as a union of wildcard expressions.
However, there are some specific cases where it can be simplified:
(8)
1011xxxx ∪ 1011xxxx = 1011xxxx
1010xxxx ∪ 1000xxxx = 10x0xxxx
4.3. Complementation. The complement of header h is the union of all headers that do
not intersect with h.
Example:
(9) (01011xxx)′ = 1xxxxxxx ∪ x0xxxxxx ∪ xx1xxxxx ∪ xxx0xxxx ∪ xxxx0xxx
4.4. Difference. The difference is defined using complement and intersect operations:
(10) A−B = A ∩B′
It can be used to check if one header is a subset of another :
(11) A ⊆ B ⇔ A−B = ∅
Example:
(12)
101xxx0x− 01011x0x = 101xxx0x
∩(1xxxxxxx∪x0xxxxxx∪xx1xxxxx∪xxx0xxxx∪xxxx0xxx∪xxxxxx1x)
= 101xxx0x ∪ 101xxx0x ∪ 101xxx0x ∪ 1010xx0x ∪ 101x0x0x ∪ ∅
= 101xxx0x ∪ 101xxx0x ∪ 101xxx0x ∪ 1010xx0x ∪ 101x0x0x
In this case 101xxx0x is not a subset of 01011x0x.
5. Reachability use-case
One common networking and security problem is nodes reachability.
In particular, in security, absence of reachability could mean:
• One or mode nodes have been compromised
• Flow tables are altered and don’t work anymore as designed
• One or more applications have injected rules into the system that affects communication
• A denial-of-service attack is in progress
Thus, reachability check is a great use-case for our domain of interest, because it allows us
to face a large class of security problems.
The reachability function R between a and b is:
(13) Ra→b =
⋃
a→b paths
{Tn(Γ(Tn−1(. . . (Γ(T1(h, p))))))}
Where:
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• For each path a→ b the transfer functions along the path are: T1, T2, . . . , Tn−1, Tn
• Γ functions are needed to compute which is the input port of the next transfer
function that is linked with the output port returned by the previous transfer
function
The result is a union of wildcard expressions that describe which headers can reach
from a to b.
If the result is empty (∅), it means there aren’t any paths that can flow packets from that
source to that destination with the given network topology.
6. HSA issues
Header Space Analysis has been developed without considering the dynamic networking
needs of SDN.
In fact HSA is unable to stay in sync with the network state incrementally, but instead it
needs to recompute all transformations every time network changes. This means it doesn’t scale
well with typical SDN lifecycle operations.

CHAPTER 5
NetPlumber
1. Plumbing Graph
NetPlumber[4] is a verification tool based on Header Space Analysis that provides
real-time model-based policy checking for dynamic networks.
NetPlumber registers all possible paths of flows through the network in a graph, called
Plumbing Graph:
Figure 1. Plumbing Graph
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Where:
• A rule node represents the rules in the network. A rule is a OpenFlow-like tuple
(match, action) and it can forward, rewrite, encapsulate or decapsulate incoming pack-
ets. In fact, every rule has:
– A match wildcard expression: used to match incoming flow
– A set of in-ports: used to select which input traffic should be considered or
ignored
– A out-port: used to propagate traffic to the next hop
– A rewrite wildcard expression used to perform changes in the flow that passes
through the rule
• A next-hop dependency from node A to B represents a link from rule A’s network
box to rule B’s network box
• Forwarding rules have priorities. A intra-table dependency is a way to represent
priority between rules of the same table and thus which should be considered first when
flows comes into the table
• A source node is a node capable to generate flow. This flow generator can be used
to propagate flow in rule nodes of the Plumbing Graph, useful to check whether
policies and assertions are met
• A sink node is the dual of a source node. It generates sink flow which traverses the
Plumbing Graph in the reverse direction. When reaching a rule node, a sink flow
is processed by the inverse of the rule. sink nodes don’t increase the expressiveness
of NetPlumber but can be used to optimize or simplify some policies
• probe nodes are used to check policy or invariants. Typically they process flow coming
from sink nodes or source nodes and check the path and header of the received flows
for violations of expected behavior. The policies and assertions are declared using a
language called Flowexp
2. Sync with SDN
One of the main reasons because NetPlumber is very suited for SDN is that it can easily
respond to SDN events:
SDN NetPlumber
Flow-rule added in a network box Add rule node and potentially change intra-table
dependencies and next-hop dependencies
Flow-rule deleted in a network box Delete rule node, associated intra-table dependen-
cies
network box added Plumbing Graph remains unchanged
network box removed Delete all rule nodes of the relative table
Link added Add next-hop dependencies between rule nodes
with ports affected by the link
Link removed Remove relative next-hop dependencies between af-
fected rule nodes
3. Policy check
NetPlumber uses source nodes (or sink nodes) to generate flow, probe nodes to get
the generated flow and check conditions.
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A probe node is configured with:
• A filter Flowexp: used to decide which flows should be considered
• A test Flowexp: used to test whether the policy is met
Conditions and filters are declared in probe nodes with a language called Flowexp Lan-
guage, a Domain Specific Language capable of expressing policies and invariants.
Flowexp Language is a regular expression language designed to check constraints on the
history of flows received by probe nodes.
The following table will show the BNF syntax of Flowexp Language:
Constraint → True | False
| !Constraint
| (Constraint | Constraint)
| (Constraint & Constraint)
| PathConstraint
| HeaderConstraint
PathConstraint → list(Pathlet)
Pathlet → Port Specifier [p ∈ {Pi}]
| Table Specifier [t ∈ {Ti}]
| Skip Next Hop [.]
| Skip Zero or More Hops [.∗]
| Beginning of Path [∧]
| End of Path [$]
HeaderConstraint → Hreceived ∩Hconstraint |
Hreceived ⊂ Hconstraint | Hreceived = Hconstraint
First production rule (Constraint) gives us the possibility to create composite rules starting
from simple constraints and combining them into more complex rules.
Second production rule defines what is the main content of a Flowexp: an ordered list of
elementary building blocks called pathlets.
A pathlet is a way to specify constraints on the path taken by a flow. pathlets are
sequentially checked and if a constraint fails, all the Flowexp fails.
Third production rule (PathConstraint) defines how a pathlet can be made:
• Port Specifier: Constraint on which port the flow should pass through
• Table Specifier: Constraint on which table the flow should pass through
• Skip Next Hop: Don’t apply any constraint on the next hop in the flow’s path
• Skip Zero or More Hops: Same as Skip Next Hop but with different cardinality
• Beginning of Path: Constraint that specifies the flow should begin its path with that
pathlet and thus next flow’s hop should match the next pathlet
• End of Path: Constraint that specifies the flow should end its path with that pathlet
and thus there aren’t any flow hops left
Last production rule (HeaderConstraint) defines constraints on the packet’s content of in-
terest (called header in HSA and NetPlumber).
As we’ll see in the next chapter, that language has been mapped into ONOS in order to allow
ONOS applications to create flow expressions based on SDN terms. The system will, underneath,
translate SDN terms into respective NetPlumber terms.
4. Reachability check use-case
In previous sections NetPlumber framework and relative abstractions have been intro-
duced.
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Now we’ll try to model a Reachability Check Policy with NetPlumber.
The reachability problem from node A to node B can be formulated as: “there should exist
some flow that can travel from node A to node B”.
A possible solution is to use:
• A source node that generates a wildcarded flow at each of node A ports
• A source probe node connected to destination port of B with the following condition:
(14) ∃f : f.path ∼ [∧(p ∈ {P1, P2, . . . , Pn})]
Where {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} are the source ports of node A
CHAPTER 6
Model Checking Service
1. Vision
In the last chapters, we’ve seen many security issues related to the current state of SDN plat-
form.
In fact there are a lot of threats regarding vulnerabilities or weak designs that could lead to
attacks and exploitation activity.
However, let’s try to analyse those problems from a different perspective. Instead of focusing
on vulnerabilities or weaknesses, let’s focus on the consequences and the effects. Let’s try to
answer to the question “What happens if vulnerability is exploited and attack succeeds?”, instead
of “How can I recognize every vulnerability and attack surface?”
This vision puts us in an abstract conceptual space suitable for the system that we want
to realize, without having to consider every single source of potential security issues, but instead
focusing on side-effects.
2. Goals
Let’s define some high-level concrete goals:
2.1. The development process.
We’ve chosen an incremental and model-driven development process.
In the first iteration we want to build a basic artifact, with at least the Case Study working,
while keeping the system open for extension, in order to implement more case studies in possible
later works.
2.2. Think about problems, not solutions.
The purpose of this thesis is also to define a generic framework to face up new security
problems in SDN networks, without having to reinvent the wheel every time a new security issue
appears.
Since technologies become obsolete, but problems don’t, we want to design abstrac-
tion layers to decouple technology-specific parts with technology-independent ones.
Following this idea, we should define:
(1) A formalization of MCS requirements in the section requirements analysis
(2) A formalization of MCS problem in the section problem analysis
(3) A formalization of MCS design in the section project
2.3. First things first.
Important things should always have higher priority.
Since we have limited resources, in this thesis we will follow this ordered list of priorities:
(1) problem analysis
(2) project
(3) Main abstractions implementation
(4) Implementation of technology-independent parts
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(5) Implementation of technology-dependent parts
2.4. Encourage software reuse.
We should use as much as possible existing analysis to popular problems and relative designs.
For this reason we’ll useDesign Patterns andBest Practices to speed up the development
process and to create a better final artifact.
3. Requirements
Let’s try to be our customers and to formulate requirements in a human-language:
Develop a model-checking based policy system, that allows to build a network
model and check if relative policies are met.
The model should be kept in sync automatically with the underlying Software
Defined Network state, without any manual intervention.
The system should allow to insert parametrized policies to perform checks on
the network state.
They should be inserted manually, by human operators called Network Policy
Designers.
When network changes, the changes should be automatically propagated to the
underlying network model to the policy system.
In particular when devices, links and interaction rules between them are added,
updated or deleted, the network model should reflect changes accordingly.
Policy checks should rely just on the model, because network couldn’t be
accessible at the time when check is done and because network probing could lead
to false-positives or false-negatives.
Policy checks should be real-time, thus network changes should trigger
re-evaluation of existing policies.
The output of policy checks should be available to external operators. Those
operators, called Network Policy Response Operator, have different role than
Network Policy Designers, in fact they shouldn’t be allowed to add new policies
but just check the state of existing policies.
Possibly the system should be flexible enough to add new kinds of policy checks
without having to reinvent the wheel, but relying on the existing system,
instructing it with the new policy behavior.
In successive steps, during requirements analysis, we’ll try to refine and formalize the
requirements defined above.
4. Case Study
In addition to the generic requirements, we want to consider a specific case-study, relevant
for as many security aspects as possible.
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However, since the model-checking framework is generic, the security expert can place as
many different policies as needed, in order to enforce the desired network behavior.
This is just another strength of MCS: it doesn’t implement any policy by itself, but provides
the security expert the needed tool to define specific policy to meet specific security needs.
A good case study is a Reachability Check, because it allows to detect a wide range of
problems seen in previous chapters:
• Denial-of-Service attacks can be detected with a Reachability Check, because if
an intermediate or edge node is under DoS, the nodes under test aren’t reachable. Also
the check is real-time, allowing an operator or an automatic system to automatically
mitigate the attack as soon as it happens, without any significant delay between the
attack and the detection
• SDN Controller attacks that can possibly result in database corruption, changing
its perception of the underlying network
• One or more network boxes have been compromised and flow-rules don’t permit
nodes reachability anymore
• Attacks that could cause inner loops in the network, difficult to be detected by normal
real network scans, can be detected easily with a model-based check
• System resources exhaustion sometimes can lead to DoS and thus can be detected
• Some kind of SDN Controller exploitation, when forwarding activity is compro-
mised
What does not detect:
• Malware infection in SDN Controller that leads to some database information leak-
age or other side effects that don’t affect nodes connectivity
• Any kind of exploitation both in SDN Controller and network boxes without
changing or compromising traffic forwarding
• SBI communication flooding. In that case Plumbing Graph isn’t updated and is
unable to detect the attack
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5. requirements analysis
5.1. Glossary.
Let’s define meaning of terms used in the requirements above in the following glossary, in
order to reduce ambiguity between terms:
Term Synonym Meaning
Model Check Policy Check Check if a single or a set of
policies is met
network model Policy Model State of the network model
Network State Physical Network State State of the physical network,
how devices are connected
and linked, which flow-rules
are installed
Software Defined Network SDN Standard name used to re-
fer to the underlying network
technology
Assertion — Rule about a condition that
the network model can re-
spect
Policy — Parametrized set of assertions
that is met if every assertion
is evaluated to true
Policy Behavior — The behavior of a policy:
what the policy is supposed to
check
Network Policy Designer — Professional role that has
responsibility to instantiate
policies with custom parame-
ters
Network Policy Response Op-
erator
— Professional role that can take
a look at network model
output and policies state
Real-time — Function should take effect
immediately, when needed in-
puts and dependencies are
available, without having to
restart the system or part of
it
Policy State Policy output, output of pol-
icy checks
Status of a policy: if it is met
or not
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5.2. Requirements Model.
The model formalizes the requirements declared in Requirements section.
This model has been introduced to overcome the necessity to glue the requirements document
with the rest of the development process.
In particular:
• We formalize the functional requirements, that will be used later in the use-cases
• We formalize the non-functional requirements, that will be used later in the
project
5.3. functional requirements.
functional requirements are the functions of MCS. A function is described by a set of
inputs, the behavior and the outputs. In other words, functional requirements are what the
system is supposed to do.
This model expresses three main concepts:
• Features: Describe pieces of functional behavior that yield a specific result
• Business Rules: It’s a catalogue of explicit business rules which are required to be
implemented within the current project. Business Rules are typically executed during
program execution and control the processing of information and transactions. They
can be seen as constraints that has to be respected in order to allow correct program
execution (in terms of the customer expectations)
• User Interface: Contain high-level descriptions of end-user visible screens and forms
which are required to support the proposed system
Figure 1. functional requirements — Features
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Figure 2. functional requirements — Business Logic
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Figure 3. functional requirements — UI
5.4. non-functional requirements.
non-functional requirements specify criteria that can be used to judge the quality of
the software artifacts.
In other words, non-functional requirements are how the system does what is supposed
to do.
The model below supplies a taxonomy of the available non-functional requirements,
as defined in the standard ISO/IEC 9126.
We remind that every well made system should respect all of those requirements, at least
with some degree of compliance.
However our particular software MCS pays particular attention to:
• Functionality:
– Accuracy
– Interoperability
– Functionality Compliance
• Efficency:
– Time Behavior
• Usability:
– Learnability
– Operability
• Usability:
– Analyzability
– Changeability
– Testability
• Portability:
– Adaptability
– Installability
– Co-Existence
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Software Quality
(Standard ISO/IEC 9126)
Functionality
Suitability The software can satisfy user needs
Accuracy The software results are exactly those agreed with the customer
Interoperability
The software can interact with other softwares specified by the 
customer
Security
The software protects sensitive data, denying the access to 
unauthorized people and granting the access to authorized people
Functionality 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the functionality standards
Reliability
Maturity The software is able to prevent errors and to avoid incorrect results
Fault Tolerance
A fault-tolerant software is able to preserve predetermined levels of 
performance even if there are errors or bad software usage
Recoverability
As a consequence of malfunctioning, the software is able to restore a 
predetermined level of performance and to recover relevant informations
Reliability 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the reliability standards
Efficiency
Time Behaviour
The capability to provide acceptable response time and elaboration time 
in predetermined conditions
Resource 
Utilisation
The capability to use the available amount and kind of resources 
adequately
Efficiency 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the efficiency  standards
Usability
Understandabili
ty
The software provides the facility to the users to understand the product 
concepts and its persistence
Learnability The software has a reduced and adaptive learning curve
Operability
The user can use the software for its purposes and control the software 
usage
Attractiveness The software is pleasant and enjoyable
Maintainability
Analyzability
The software provides the capability to analyze the product artifacts in 
order to localize find possible errors
Changeability The software capability to changes
Stability The software is able to avoid possible errors caused by bad modifications
Testability The capability to test the software changes
Portability
Adaptability
The software capability to be ported in new platforms without the need to 
apply changes specific to those platforms
Installability The software capability to be installed in a platform
Co-Existence
The software can be installed in a platform independently from the 
already installed software
Replaceability
The software can be used to replace another software with the same 
functional requirements
Maintainability 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the maintainability standards
Usability 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the usability standards
Portability 
Compliance
The software is compliant with the portability standards
Software Quality:
An exhaustive list of
non-functional requirements
Figure 4. non-functional requirements
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6. use-cases
The use-case model is a catalogue of system functionality described using UML use-cases.
Each use-case represents a single, repeatable interaction that an actor experiences when using
the system.
actors are the users of the system being modeled. Each actor will have a well-defined
role, and in the context of that role have useful interactions with the system.
A person may perform the role of more than one actor, although they will only assume
one role during one use-case interaction. An actor role may be performed by a non-human
system, such as another computer program.
Figure 5. use-cases
They involve the following actors:
Figure 6. actors
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7. domain model
The domain model is a view of all the objects that make up an area of interest, and their
relationships. It is used here to capture the significant objects within MCS system:
Figure 7. domain model
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8. problem analysis (logic architecture)
The logic architecture shows the logical structure and interaction between the system
components.
Let’s start considering the artifacts coming from the requirements analysis:
• use-cases
• domain model
The functional requirements defined from those models are now considered to start
defining what’s the system architecture from a logical point of view.
The following UML Class diagrams show the structure of main MCS components.
MCS structure can be seen as union of four subsystems:
• UI: Permit user to interact with MCS
• Services: Expose operations and MCS functionality to UI
• Operations: Map incoming requested operations into appropriate business logic, that
change or query the network model
• network model: Model-checking abstraction, that allows to manipulate the model
with abstract terms and concepts, decoupled from the underlying technology. It also
allows to define policies that check model properties
8.1. UI Structure.
Figure 8. logic architecture — Structure — UI
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8.2. Services Structure.
Figure 9. logic architecture — Structure — Services
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8.3. Operation Handling Structure.
Figure 10. logic architecture — Structure — Operation Handling
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8.4. Operation Data Types.
Figure 11. logic architecture — Structure — Operation Data Types
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8.5. network model Data Types.
Figure 12. logic architecture — Structure — network model Data Types
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8.6. SDN Data Types.
Figure 13. logic architecture — Structure — SDN Data Types
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8.7. Execute-Operation Interaction.
The following UML sequence diagram shows the basic interaction flow when a Network Policy
Designer triggers an Operation to create a new Policy:
Figure 14. logic architecture — Interaction — Execute Operation
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8.8. Show-Policy-State Interaction.
In the interaction to show policies state, we’ve decided to stay as much generic as possible,
since the solution details will be defined in later steps:
Figure 15. logic architecture — Interaction — Show Policy State
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8.9. network model Interaction.
When there are changes in the SDN, the network model should be kept in sync with the
changes. The following interaction diagram shows an example of synchronization, when a SDN
element is added and the change should be propagated to the model (the other interactions, like
remove and change, are very similar):
Figure 16. logic architecture — Interaction — Sync SDN with network model
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8.10. Check-Reachability Interaction.
The following interaction example shows how a “Check Reachability” policy is created and
added to the network model:
Figure 17. logic architecture — Interaction — Check Reachability
9. Abstraction Gap
The Southbound Interface of choice will be OpenFlow. This seems to be a reasonable
choice, since it’s the precursor of dynamic networks and it’s the most widespread technology for
SBI.
ONOS will be the SDN Controller because it’s production-ready and provides all the needs
for our proof-of-concept. Underlying network will be simulated using Mininet. It allows to work
on different and custom network topologies.
NetPlumber has been shaped for SDN, thus it is particularly suited for implementing un-
derlying model-checking mechanisms in our domain of interest.
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Figure 18. Reference Platform
Thus, from now on, we will focus on those technologies, while trying to be as much generic
as possible.
10. Risk Analysis
The abstraction gap between the problem and the Reference Platform chosen above is
sustainable.
11. project
In this step we introduce technology-specific solutions, in particular:
• ONOS will be used as SDN solution
• NetPlumber graph (called Plumbing Graph) will be used to implement the net-
work model
11.1. Services Structure.
The project structure of the Service subsystem starts from the logic architecture
and applies the following changes:
• UserInterfaceService is abstract, the concrete implementation (called
ONOSUserInterfaceService) is the one relying on HTTP communication proto-
col, used by ONOS
• Services don’t work with abstract SDN and network model data, but instead with
ONOS network elements abstractions and Plumbing Graph nodes representation, re-
spectively
54 6. Model Checking Service
Figure 19. project — Structure — Services
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11.2. Operation Handling Structure.
It’s generic, since it doesn’t depend on particular technologies chosen.
The structure is the same as defined in logic architecture.
Figure 20. project — Structure — Operation Handling
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11.3. Operation Data Types.
Figure 21. project — Structure — Operation
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11.4. network model Structure.
Figure 22. project — Structure — network model Structure
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11.5. SDN Data Types.
SDN data types are realized with ONOS respective data types.
In fact ONOS provides a subsystem called Device Subsystem, that is responsible for dis-
covering and tracking the devices that comprise the network, and for enabling operators and
applications to control them.
Figure 23. project — Structure — SDN Data Types
ONOS will then map the defined data types with the underlying network, to keep the state
consistent. In our case with OpenFlow data types:
DeviceManager OpenFlowDeviceProvider
Device OpenFlowSwitch
DeviceId / ElementId Dpid
Port OFPortDesc
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11.6. UI Interaction.
The chosen solution for User-Interface is the ONOS Web UI. It relies on modern technologies
like Angular 2 to reduce the abstraction gap between the client technology and modern UI needs,
in term of changes reaction and client structure.
Interactions between client and server follow the pattern request / response, thus they’ll
use the HTTP protocol, designed to handle that interaction pattern well.
UI updates need to be reactive, thus we will use Web Sockets as underlying communication
technology.
11.7. Check-Reachability Interaction.
Considering the Check Reachability case-study, the main interactions are:
Figure 24. project — Interaction — Check Reachability
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12. Implementation
Considering previous artifacts defined in the MCS project, we’ve successfully implemented
the Model Check Service.
To get a copy of the source code and relative documentation, ask the author at molari dot
alessandro at gmail dot com.
13. Tests
Core parts of MCS have been tested using jUnit testing framework.
Tests are organized in:
• 60 integration tests: to test interaction between MCS and the underlying Net-
Plumber service
• 18 unit tests: to test single isolated functionality of critical parts
For more details on tests structure and implementation, you can take a look at: https:
//github.com/alem0lars/mcs/tree/master/src/test/java/me/alem0lars/mcs.
14. Demo
A virtual machine called MCS VM has been created. It features:
• A working instance of ONOS
• Networking based on Mininet
• Customized utility scripts to interact with ONOS and perform deployment of MCS
To get a copy, ask to molari dot alessandro at gmail dot com.
To uncompress it run: unzip mcs-vm.zip
Now you can import the OVA file in VirtualBox.
The following ports need to be available:
• 22 to connect to VM via SSH
• 8181 to access the Web UI
So, if network interface is a NAT, you need to configure port forwarding accordingly.
You also need to get a copy of MCS at: https://github.com/alem0lars/mcs.
Build the project to generate the application package.
Now you can deploy the application into the ONOS instance available in the MCS VM.
Here are some useful commands:
• Build ONOS:
cd $ONOS_ROOT && ./tools/build/onos-buck build onos --show-output
• Build ONOS internal test, to check the installation works correctly:
cd $ONOS_ROOT && ./tools/build/onos-buck test
• Start ONOS:
cd $ONOS_ROOT && ./tools/build/onos-buck run onos-local -- clean debug
• Attach to the Apache Karaf console of ONOS:
cd $ONOS_ROOT && ./tools/test/bin/onos localhost
• Start mininet:
sudo mn --controller=remote --topo=linear,10
Where:
– –controller=remote means that mininet OpenFlow nodes should use be con-
nected to an external controller (with default port)
– –topo=TOPOLOGY allows to choose an existing topology with custom parameters
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14.1. Results. The MCS reachability check has been run in a linear topology with four
switches and four hosts: The kind and size of topology chosen don’t affect the test, so we’ve
decided to keep it as much simple as possible:
Figure 25. SDN Data Plane topology
First of all, we need to install the MCS application:
Figure 26. Install MCS application
Now the MCS bundle has been installed and can be activated:
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Figure 27. Activate MCS application
ONOS recognizes that MCS defines a custom Web UI, so it asks to enable it:
Figure 28. Enable MCS Web UI
The MCS UI is available in the Model Checking tab:
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Figure 29. MCS UI “Model Checking” tab
The UI is automatically mapped with the predefined operations that MCS allows.
In fact, when opened, it shows the available operations, in this case Check Reachability:
Figure 30. Model Check operations UI
If we select that operations, a panel is prompted to insert the operation parameters.
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In the example we’ve started MCS with devices and links already added, but without any
flows installed.
This doesn’t affect solution generality, and also shows how NetPlumber and MCS can easily
adapt when underlying network changes.
The following logs show the startup process, that involves external dependencies to be started
just before the start of MCS components:
2017-10-31 14:47:22,846 |
Starting NetPlumber server ...
bound to ‘0.0.0.0:9000‘
with wildcard size of‘224‘
using log configuration at ...
2017-10-31 14:47:23,300 | Started OSGi component
...
After components have been started and activated, the MCS service called
NetPlumberSyncManager will perform initial synchronization of SDN devices and links with the
Plumbing Graph:
2017-10-31 14:47:23,303 |
Performing initial NPG synchronization
2017-10-31 14:47:23,310 |
Synchronizing NPG: ‘of:0000000000000003‘ with ports=‘[1, 2, 3]‘ added
==> adding ‘Table{id=1, ports=[1, 2, 3]}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,316 |
Synchronizing NPG: ‘of:0000000000000004‘ with ports=‘[1, 2]‘ added
==> adding ‘Table{id=2,ports=[4, 5]}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,321 |
Synchronizing NPG: ‘of:0000000000000001‘ with ports=‘[1, 2]‘ added
==> adding ‘Table{id=3,ports=[6, 7]}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,326 |
Synchronizing NPG: ‘of:0000000000000002‘ with ports=‘[1, 2, 3]‘ added
==> adding ‘Table{id=4, ports=[8, 9, 10]}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,331 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Link{src=of:0000000000000003/3,
dst=of:0000000000000004/2,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=3 <-> dst_port=5}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,339 |
Synchronizing NPG:
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Link{src=of:0000000000000002/3,
dst=of:0000000000000003/2,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=10 <-> dst_port=2}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,342 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Link{src=of:0000000000000002/2,
dst=of:0000000000000001/2,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=9 <-> dst_port=7}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,344 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Link{src=of:0000000000000004/2,
dst=of:0000000000000003/3,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=5 <-> dst_port=3}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,347 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Link{src=of:0000000000000003/2,
dst=of:0000000000000002/3,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=2 <-> dst_port=10}‘ to NPG
2017-10-31 14:47:23,350 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Link{src=of:0000000000000001/2,
dst=of:0000000000000002/2,
type=DIRECT,
state=ACTIVE,
expected=false} added
==> adding ‘Link{src_port=7 <-> dst_port=9}‘ to NPG
After initial synchronization, the resulting state is the following:
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Figure 31. Plumbing Graph synchronized with SDN topology
The following logs show the client asked to MCS what are the available operations that can
be performed, and the server responded with “Check Reachability” operation:
2017-10-31 14:47:29,137 |
Processing request: operationDetailsRequest
2017-10-31 14:47:29,138 |
Providing operation response for
Optional[CheckReachabilityOperation{
fields={name=Check Reachability,
description=Check the reachability between two nodes,
id=621fe6b0-c32a-47c3-949a-c7714fbd8fe2}}]
2017-10-31 14:47:29,196 |
Sending response: operationDetailsResponse
Let’s try to submit a new reachability check between devices of:1 at port 1 and of:4 at
port 4, so basically we’re checking if host 1 can communicate with host 4 :
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Figure 32. Check Reachability operation parameters
In the UI the user can insert the ONOS devices and ports that should be checked whether
they’re reachable or not.
In particular the user reasons in terms of SDN concepts and not with NetPlumber concept.
This is the result of MCS abstractions layers, defined to hide internal interaction details to the
user, so if the internal model-checking framework changes, the user experience isn’t affected at
all.
When the user presses the arrow button, MCS adds needed source nodes and source
probe nodes needed to perform reachability check and the underlying NetPlumber daemon
updates the probes state every time Plumbing Graph changes:
2017-10-31 14:48:08,581 |
Linking Source Node to NPG: Link{src_port=11 <-> dst_port=6}
2017-10-31 14:48:08,590 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Adding SourceNode{
ports=[11],
HeaderSpace{
wildcards=[MatchWildcard{bits=xxxxxxxx..., size=224}],
diff=[[]]}}
2017-10-31 14:48:08,603 |
Linking Source Probe Node to NPG: Link{src_port=12 <-> dst_port=4}
2017-10-31 14:48:08,606 |
Synchronizing NPG:
Adding SourceProbeNode{
ports=[12],
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probe_type=ProbeType{label=existential},
filter=BooleanFlowExpression{value=true},
test=PathFlowExpression{
pathlets=[LastPortsPathlet{
ports=[PortId{device=of:0000000000000001,
port=1}]}]}}‘
2017-10-31 14:48:08,628 |Sending response: performOperationResponse
Right after adding source probe node for reachability check, we can see the condition
isn’t met, since there aren’t any flow-rules and thus rule nodes:
2017-10-31 14:48:08,624
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Start Source Probe:
Started in False State
Now let’s add flow-rules that allows devices to communicate through the established links:
2017-10-31 14:49:02,958 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f0000302f74d4,
deviceId=of:0000000000000004,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:1],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742870,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=2,
index=-1,
in_ports=[4, 5],
out_ports=[4],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,
11010101,01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,
00000011,01000111,xxxxxxxx,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:02,976 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f000004381f02,
deviceId=of:0000000000000001,
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priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:1,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742861,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=3,
index=-1,
in_ports=[6, 7],
out_ports=[7],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,
11010101,01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,
00000011,01000111,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:02,979 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f0000eaafcfe5,
deviceId=of:0000000000000004,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:1,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742877,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=2,
index=-1,
in_ports=[4, 5],
out_ports=[5],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,
01000111,01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,
00000000,11010101,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:02,989 |
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Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f0000a344c5c7,
deviceId=of:0000000000000002,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:3],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742865,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=4,
index=-1,
in_ports=[8, 9, 10],
out_ports=[10],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,
11010101,01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,
00000011,01000111,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:02,993 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f0000aef00501,
deviceId=of:0000000000000001,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:1],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742881,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=3,
index=-1,
in_ports=[6, 7],
out_ports=[6],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,
01000111,01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,
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00000000,11010101,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:02,997 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f00001713d4f1,
deviceId=of:0000000000000003,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:3],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742868,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=1,
index=-1,
in_ports=[1, 2, 3],
out_ports=[3],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,
11010101,01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,
00000011,01000111,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:03,004 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f000020290603,
deviceId=of:0000000000000003,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:3,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742878,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=1,
index=-1,
in_ports=[1, 2, 3],
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out_ports=[2],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,
01000111,01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,
00000000,11010101,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
2017-10-31 14:49:03,008 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowRule{
id=6f000091eb3b33,
deviceId=of:0000000000000002,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:3,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509457742880,
payLoad=null} added
==> adding RuleNode{
table_id=4,
index=-1,
in_ports=[8, 9, 10],
out_ports=[9],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,
01000111,01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,
00000000,11010101,xxxxxxxx,...} to NPG
After those flow-rules events have been catch by NetPlumberSyncManager and, using
NetPlumberGraphManager, Plumbing Graph has been updated, we can see the source probe
node state changed:
2017-10-31 14:48:08,624
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Start Source Probe:
Started in False State
2017-10-31 14:49:03,002
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Add Rule:
Met Probe Condition
2017-10-31 14:49:03,002
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Add Rule:
More Flows Met Probe Condition
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This clearly states that after adding rule nodes relative to the added flow-rules, the reach-
ability check policy has been met.
As a counter-proof, we can try to remove the flow rules added before:
2017-10-31 14:58:59,232 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f0000a344c5c7,
deviceId=of:0000000000000002,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:3],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339170,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339170} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=4,
index=-1,
in_ports=[8, 9, 10],
out_ports=[10],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,261 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f00001713d4f1,
deviceId=of:0000000000000003,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:3],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
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cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339181,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339181} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=1,
index=-1,
in_ports=[1, 2, 3],
out_ports=[3],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,273 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f0000302f74d4,
deviceId=of:0000000000000004,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:1],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339177,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339177} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=2,
index=-1,
in_ports=[4, 5],
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out_ports=[4],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,280 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f000091eb3b33,
deviceId=of:0000000000000002,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:3,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339170,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339170} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=4,
index=-1,
in_ports=[8, 9, 10],
out_ports=[9],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,283 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f000004381f02,
deviceId=of:0000000000000001,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:1,
ETH_DST:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2,
ETH_SRC:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
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meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339169,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339169} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=3,
index=-1,
in_ports=[6, 7],
out_ports=[7],
match=01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,293 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f0000eaafcfe5,
deviceId=of:0000000000000004,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:1,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339177,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339177} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=2,
index=-1,
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in_ports=[4, 5],
out_ports=[5],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,296 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f0000aef00501,
deviceId=of:0000000000000001,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:2,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:1],
deferred=[],
transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339169,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339169} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=3,
index=-1,
in_ports=[6, 7],
out_ports=[6],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
2017-10-31 14:58:59,301 |
Synchronizing NPG: FlowEntry{rule=FlowEntry{
id=6f000020290603,
deviceId=of:0000000000000003,
priority=10,
selector=[IN_PORT:3,
ETH_DST:72:3A:B9:F8:00:AB,
ETH_SRC:36:A7:89:EB:C0:E2],
treatment=TrafficTreatment{immediate=[OUTPUT:2],
deferred=[],
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transition=None,
meter=None,
cleared=false,
metadata=null},
tableId=0,
created=1509458339181,
payLoad=null},
life=596000000000,
liveType=UNKNOWN,
packets=579,
bytes=56742,
errCode=-1,
errType=-1,
lastSeen=1509458339181} removed
==> removing RuleNode{
table_id=1,
index=-1,
in_ports=[1, 2, 3],
out_ports=[2],
match=01101100,11100101,10010001,11010111,00000011,01000111,
01001110,01011100,10011101,00011111,00000000,11010101,
xxxxxxxx,...} from NPG
Now, taking a look at source probe node state, we see that reachability check conditions
aren’t met anymore:
2017-10-31 14:58:59,237 -
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Remove Rule:
Fewer Flows Met Probe Condition
2017-10-31 14:58:59,238 -
Existential Probe 2 Activated after event Remove Rule:
Failed Probe Condition
14.2. Summing up. In this section we’ve seen a basic demo of the MCS operation Reacha-
bility Check :
(1) Initially there weren’t any flow-rules installed, so the policy wasn’t met
(2) Then we’ve added the flow-rules and we’ve seen the synchronized model started to
match the policy
(3) Finally we’ve tried to remove flow-rules and we’ve seen that the policy wasn’t met
anymore, as expected
This was a simple example that showed how model-checking can be useful to perform security
and networking checks on the underlying network without having to directly interact with the
network itself.
However, the developed application is generic, and it can be used for different operations
and/or different underlying model-checking technologies, different than NetPlumber.
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